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Womb for Rent: The Future of International
Trade in Surrogacy
Iris Leibowitz-Dori
In 1995, young Polish women were brought to the Nether-
lands to serve as surrogates for infertile couples.' They were
recruited through advertisements in Polish newspapers which
promised "good fees" and "discretion" in return for their service
as surrogate mothers. 2 To participate, they were instructed to
contact an "agent" on the docks of Szczecin who would then take
them to the Netherlands to live with their prospective custom-
ers. This recruitment process occurred despite the fact that sur-
rogate motherhood for commercial gain has been banned in the
Netherlands for two years and carries a prison sentence of up to
one year. 3
Illegal international trade in surrogacy is not unique to the
Netherlands, 4 and the demand for surrogates will only increase
in the future. Surrogacy targets the same market as its coun-
terpart, adoption, where demand greatly exceeds supply.5 To
meet the high demand for reproductive services, surrogacy may
become more common as a solution for childless couples because
it provides a better solution to infertility than adoption. 6 Even if
1. Abi Daruvalla, Poles Hired as Surrogate Mums in Illegal Trade, INDEP.-
LONDON, June 4, 1995, at 16.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Similar operations take place in other European nations, among
them Germany and Belgium. Id. International trade in surrogacy is not lim-
ited to Europe. Recent studies estimate that the market in Taiwan alone could
absorb 10,000 surrogates. Ken Chiu, Infertile Women Want Ban on Surrogate
Mothers Lifted, FREE CHINA J. (Taiwan), May 17, 1996, at 4.
5. Richard Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of
Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21, 22 (1989). Posner
also states that the most important factor in explaining the growing popularity
of surrogacy is "the acute shortage of babies for adoption." Id. at 22.
6. See Beverly Horsburgh, Jewish Women, Black Women: Guarding
Against the Oppression of Surrogacy, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 29, 62 (stating
that the shortage of healthy white newborns is one of the reasons childless
couples have turned to surrogacy instead of adoption); see also Posner, supra
329
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there was no shortage of babies for adoption, there would be a
demand for surrogate motherhood;7 people desire genetic con-
tinuity, and surrogacy enables them to satisfy this desire.8
In a market driven by high demand, profit-minded in-
termediaries will increase supply in any way possible. One way
to do this is to expand internationally like the adoption indus-
try.9 As with adoption, however, unregulated international
trade in surrogacy can lead to the widespread abuse of women
note 5 (stating that surrogacy is a better substitute for adoption). American
citizens have increasingly turned to international adoptions in response to the
shortage of babies and the length of the adoption process. Sara Goldsmith, Cri-
tique of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's New Rule Governing
Transnational Adoptions, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1773, 1774 (1995). Although rela-
tively quicker than domestic adoption, international adoption is still compli-
cated, involving state adoption laws, federal immigration law, and the law of
the child's native country. Id. On an international level the same argument
applies; surrogacy is a better substitute for adoption.
7. Posner, supra note 5, at 22.
8. Id. Currently, there are two types of surrogacy arrangements: biologi-
cal and gestational surrogacy. ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HuMAN
REPRODUUCTION, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 109-10
(1995).
Biological Surrogacy typically consists of artificial insemination of a
surrogate with the sperm of a man whose wife is infertile. .. This form
of surrogacy does not require sophisticated medical technology; it is a
social and legal arrangement whereby the surrogate agrees to provide
one-half of the genetic material, carry the fetus to term, deliver the
baby, and surrender it to the father and his wife. But the term "surro-
gate" in this scenario is a misnomer because the "surrogate" is provid-
ing one-half of the genetic material and therefore is, in reality, the
mother...
Recent developments in technology have made possible other
forms of surrogacy. In gestational surrogacy, the surrogate agrees to
carry a fetus to which she typically has no biological relationship. For
example, if the wife produces ova but cannot become pregnant, her ova
can be removed surgically, fertilized in vitro with her husband's sperm,
and implanted in a gestational surrogate.
Id. at 109-10.
9. Although international adoption helped solve the demand crisis follow-
ing World War II, it did not become an alternative for domestic adoption until
recently. Rosanne L. Romano, Intercountry Adoption: An Overview for the Prac-
titioner, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 545, 549 (1994). See also Holly C. Kennard, Note,
Curtailing the Sale and Trafficking of Children: A Discussion of the Hague Con-
ference Convention In Respect of Intercountry Adoptions, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus.
L. 623, 623 (1994) (stating that each state has its own baby-selling rules to stop
"profitable" adoptions). During the last twenty years, the domestic market has
been flooded with regulations. Id. As a result, an increasing number of child-
less couples turn to international markets for children. See Goldsmith, supra
note 6, at 1773 (stating that American citizens have increasingly turned to in-
ternational adoptions in response to the delay in the domestic adoption pro-
cess). Because of the similarities between adoption and surrogacy, the demand
for surrogacy will likely create a significant international market.
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and children. 10 The economic disparity of consumers of surro-
gacy and the women who offer their reproductive services for
sale is so extreme that the potential for abuse is very high.11
Without safeguards, the international trade in surrogacy will
only increase this abuse. While the exploitation of both surro-
gates and their babies already exists, no international regula-
tion protects them. 12 Ideally, there should be a treaty covering
surrogacy to address this problem. However, due to the contro-
versy surrounding surrogacy, it is unlikely that such a treaty
will be formulated in the near future.13
Part I of this note provides a background on international
trade in surrogacy, while Part II looks at regulating surrogacy
internationally. Part III analyzes the adoption market and its
trends. Part IV suggests a regulatory scheme that encompasses
surrogacy within existing international treaties. Finally, Part
VI concludes with measures that would regulate surrogacy.
I. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SURROGACY
It is inevitable that surrogacy services will be traded inter-
nationally. The current economic conditions in the "baby mar-
ket" have created strong incentives for both adoption and
surrogate services to pursue international trade channels.
10. See CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER 151 (1989). Fears about the ex-
ploitation of women are well founded. The socioeconomic disparity between the
consumers of surrogacy and the women who are likely to offer their reproduc-
tive services for sale could lead to an international commerce in human repro-
duction, using and exploiting women from developing countries. Id. See also
Gena Corea, The Reproductive Brothel, in MAN-MADE WOMEN 38, 38 (1987) (as-
serting that the greater the disparity, the greater the potential abuse of the less
powerful group). Yet, as well founded as the fears may be, the best way to han-
dle them is through regulation rather than prohibition:
Assuming an unsatisfied demand of childless couples, any legal restric-
tion on permissible forms of reproductive collaboration would merely
drive the activity underground, creating a black market...
[Iintermediary exploitation and dishonesty is granted effective immu-
nity where the activity is illegal, since the parties lack access to courts
of law to enforce the terms of their transaction.
SHALEV, supra, at 158.
11. See Nadin Taub, Surrogacy: Sorting Through the Alternatives, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 285, 288 (1990) (stating that there is an inevitable im-
balance in bargaining power between the surrogate and the potential parents;
given limited employment, educational and other opportunities available for
women, the intended parents will have greater social and economic resources
than the prospective birth mother).
12. See infra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
13. Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically As-
sisted Conception: Legal, Ethical and Social Issues, 17 Am. J.L. & MED. 329, 333
(1991).
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Adoption intermediaries have already taken advantage of these
incentives and surrogacy will soon follow as a natural substitute
for adoption. 14
"Babies, like any commodity, are subject to the law of sup-
ply and demand." 15 In the United States and Europe, declining
birth rates, combined with the largest number of infertile
couples in history, create an insatiable demand for babies. 16
Due to this demand, both adoption and surrogate services sell at
lucrative prices with high profit margins. Adoption in-
termediaries17 are often paid thousands of dollars by childless
couples desperate to find a baby.18 Surrogates "[b]uffered by the
pressures of commercial interests and near-desperate clients
searching for a technological miracle" are also paid large
amounts.' 9 Intermediaries earn as much as $20,000 per surro-
gate in some parts of the world.20 Financial incentives com-
bined with a strong demand and a severe shortage in the
domestic supply of babies lead both adoption and surrogate in-
termediaries to pursue new supply channels abroad. 21
14. See Posner, supra note 5 (stating that surrogacy is a better alternative
to adoption for some couples). See also Todd M Krim, Beyond Baby M.: Interna-
tional Perspectives on Gestational Surrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary Bio-
logical Mother, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 193, 218 (1996) (stating that the number of
cross cultural surrogacy arrangements is on the rise).
15. Kennard, supra note 9, at 625.
16. See id.; see also BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 8, at 85-86.
17. Agents or intermediaries "are defined as individuals or organizations
which are not authorized to place children for adoption but intervene in some
manner in the process of adoption." Kennard, supra note 9, at 625. They in-
clude attorneys, social workers, or simply persons acting as intermediaries be-
tween the adoptive parents and the birth parents or institutions. Id.
18. Id. at 628. Prices range from $2,500 to $15,000 per baby; attorney serv-
ices can cost as much as $13,000. Id. See also Kathleen Hunt, The Romanian
Baby Bazaar, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 24, 1991, at 23, 28 (reporting that
intermediaries in Romania offered a set of twins for $20,000).
19. BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 8, at 95. For example, in 1987 infertile
couples spent $70 million on in vitro fertilization services alone. Id.
20. Dennis Bueckert, Womb Rental Thriving Business: Critics Demand
Outlawing of Practice, WINDSOR STAR, Aug. 31, 1994, at B6. A writer posing as
a prospective client interviewed two lawyers who acted as surrogacy in-
termediaries in Canada. One of them acknowledged that the going rate for a
surrogate is $15,000 and that attorney fees are within the $20,000 range. Id.
In the United States, Noel Keane's centers currently charge an agency fee
of $16,000 and surrogate's fee of $13,000. Keane is an attorney from Michigan
who conducted the transaction between the Sterns and the surrogate White-
head. After giving birth to the baby, Whitehead changed her mind and brought
a custody suit against the Sterns in the famous Baby M. case. BLANK & MER-
RICK, supra note 8, at 113.
21. The domestic supply of babies in the United States is limited. The mar-
ket supply shortage in babies can not be satisfied through domestic channels.
332 [Vol. 6:329
1997] WOMB FOR RENT 333
Adoption has already expanded into the international mar-
ket as desperate, childless couples turn to intercountry adop-
tions after unsuccessful attempts to adopt domestic babies. 22
Nearly 20,000 children are involved in intercountry adoptions
every year. 23 International adoption provides significant income
in some parts of the world. For example, the adoption business
in South Korea yields an estimated $15-20 million annually. 24
In Guatemala, adoptions account for $5 million per year,25 and
adoptions of Honduran children in 1991 alone generated more
than $3 million in revenue. 26
Given the demand for babies in the domestic market and
the success of adoption in the international market, surrogacy
should also be internationally traded. Surrogacy provides an al-
ternative to adoption for "desirable" babies.27 When a market
opportunity exists and a substitute can be at least as profitable
Lucrative profits provide an incentive for agents to find other ways to profit
from this shortage. If the domestic supply channels remain limited or less at-
tractive, agents will attempt to expand internationally and capture additional
supply channels. See Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 1773 (stating that in response
to a declining number of American children available for adoption and the de-
lays associated with the process, couples have turned to international adop-
tions); see also Richard R. Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children, 73
TULSA L.J. 317 (1988) (stating the reasons for the decline in American children
available for adoption).
22. Kennard, supra note 9, at 628. The factors that contributed to the in-
creased interest in international adoption include: 1) a decline in the number of
healthy American babies due to the increased availability of abortion and con-
traceptive use; 2) an increase in the number of unwed mothers who choose to
keep their babies because they are more accepted in society than in the past; 3)
the increased number of Americans who postpone marriage and childbearing;
4) the shorter waiting period for international adoption (six months to one year,
compared to as long as ten years for a healthy American Caucasian child); 5)
the procedural "red tape" and stringent requirements for domestic adoption
complicated by the involvement of U.S. adoption agencies in the adoption pro-
cess; and 6) Americans' increased acceptance of children from other cultures.
Mary Ann Candelario McMillan, International Adoption: A Step Towards a
Uniform Process, 5 PACE INT'L L. REV. 137, 138-39 (1993).
23. Kennard, supra note 9, at 629.
24. Matthew Rothschild, Babies for Sale, PROGREssvE, Jan. 1988, at 20.
25. Michael S. Serrill, The Gray Market in Third World Children, TIME
INT'L, Nov. 4, 1991, at 47.
26. Honduras: Report on Child Trafficking, CENTRAL AMERICA UPDATE,
Nov. 29, 1991, available in 1991 WL 2554440.
27. Posner, supra note 5, at 22. The shortage is in white infants-there is
no shortage of black, handicapped, or older children for adoption. Unfortu-
nately, this is because there is very little demand for such children. Id.
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as the product traded, chances are high that the substitute will
also expand to the same market. 28
Surrogacy is in many ways superior to adoption. Interna-
tional surrogates are less expensive than domestic surrogates
and adoption intermediaries. 29 Because the broker is not re-
quired by law to provide additional services to the international
surrogate, such as professional and psychological counseling,
the broker will incur fewer expenses than in adoption.30 In the
absence of clear regulation, the transaction costs of intercountry
surrogacy will also be lower than intercountry adoption.31
Although surrogacy is not yet commonly traded in the inter-
national market, intermediaries and potential parents have
shown interest. Brokers have already considered using foreign
women as surrogates, 32 and foreign women have responded by
providing surrogate services. For example, a man who took out
28. The comparison is between two services: adoption and surrogacy. In
surrogacy, however, the services are supplied internationally.
29. Corea, supra note 10, at 43-44. John Stehura of the Biogenetic Founda-
tion, a surrogate agency, suggests that in poverty-stricken parts of the United
States surrogates could be found for half of the $10,000 standard fee and that in
the Third World one tenth of the standard fee would suffice. Id. at 44. Mexican
women, for example, would generally charge a lower fee than American women.
Id. As the president of a U.S. foundation that helps arrange surrogate
pregnancies stated, "If we could cross international lines, then $1,000 is a sig-
nificant sum of money, whereas here [in the U.S.] it is just a week or a month's
wages." Id.
30. In countries such as the United States the broker will, of course, have
to obey the specific state laws. However, domestically and on an international
level, the broker will end up shopping around for the countries with the least
stringent regulation which will allow him to collect the highest profit margins.
For example, an investigation in the Canadian press has confirmed that there is
a growing commerce centered in Toronto involving recruitment, screening, and
impregnation of surrogate mothers. Bueckert, supra note 20, at B7. It is done
quietly without government interference by independent agencies and thus is
less regulated. See id.; see also Krim, supra note 14, at 220 (stating that surro-
gate brokers shop around for unregulated countries for their transactions).
Further, "[a] Third World surrogate mother would not even need to be
healthy." Corea, supra note 10, at 43. Even serious health problems might be
overlooked if a potential surrogate's "diet is good and other aspects of her life
are o.k." Id. If not regulated, intermediaries will choose to save the money and
increase their profits, rather than provide health care services to international
surrogates.
31. See supra note 30. Currently, an intercountry adoption costs on aver-
age as much as $12,000, not including potentially costly travel and residency
requirements, lodging expenses, meals, ground transportation, and translation
services. Romano, supra note 9, at 554.
32. Krim, supra note 14, at 220-23. A British newspaper reported that
"adoption brokers" have tried to diversify their business to encompass interna-
tional surrogacy. Id. at 221. A British adoption specialist is under investiga-
tion because he was planning to exploit liberal surrogacy laws in the United
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a tiny classified advertisement in the San Francisco Chronicle
received 160 responses from potential surrogates in eighteen
countries, including New Zealand, Australia, Kenya, and
Bangladesh. 33
II. REGULATING SURROGACY INTERNATIONALLY
The problem with international trade in surrogacy is its po-
tential for abusing and exploiting women.3 4 Like adoption, sur-
rogacy needs to be regulated on an international level. Poor
women and children are especially vulnerable to exploitation.35
In the past, women were bullied to give up their babies and sell
them for a price as low as a piece of jewelry. 36 As the adoption
market became more promising, poor children were abducted
from their families and sold internationally, leaving their par-
ents without any hope of ever seeing them again.3 7 Unless the
surrogacy market is regulated internationally, it will face simi-
lar market abuses.38 To support their families, it is estimated
States by impregnating Eastern European women with the sperm of U.S. men.
Id.
33. NOEL P. KEANE & DENNIS L. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER (1981).
The ad suggested payment of $7,000 to the mother and another $3,000 in legal
and medical expenses. Id.
34. Krim, supra note 14, at 221-23.
35. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 8, at 122 (noting that in America, a
socioeconomic gap clearly exists between surrogates and potential parents).
Typically, couples seeking surrogate services are "white, married, and in their
late thirties or early forties." Id. at 113. Many had attended graduate school
and reported household income in excess of $50,000. Id. Surrogates were gen-
erally younger, most were married, a small percentage attended college and
most reported income of less than $30,000 per year. In another study of women
who had applied to be surrogates, 40% of the women were unemployed or re-
ceiving some form of financial assistance. Id.
If on a domestic level there is a clear socioeconomic gap between the surro-
gate and the potential parent, that gap will only further increase if the transac-
tion involves a Third World surrogate and a western couple.
36. See Baby Market Still Flourishes in Romania, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Sep. 4, 1994, at 15A (reporting the story of a Romanian couple who
gave their son away to a Nebraskan couple, believing that they gave him a bet-
ter future; the parents consented to the adoption because they wanted to save
their son from living in an institution). Id.
37. See James Rupert, Baby-Stealing Scandal in Ukraine, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 23, 1995, at All (reporting a Ukrainian investigation of local doctors who
stole or bought newborn Ukrainian babies and supplied them to foreign couples,
sometimes falsely declaring to the parents that the infants had died); see also
Laurie C. Merrill, Peru's Public Enemy No.1, RECORD (Northern New Jersey),
Oct. 7, 1992, at Al (noting reports in Peru that an American attorney helped
abduct and sell more than 4,000 Peruvian babies).
38. See JULIA J. TATE, A.B.A., SURROGACY: WHAT PROGRESS SINCE HAGAR,
BILHAH AND ZILPAH! 20-26 (1994). The 1987 case of Alejandra Nunoz is a classic
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that in some developing nations, women sell their services for as
low as $1,000-ninety percent less than surrogates in the
United States.39
The lack of international surrogacy regulation is similar to
the historic treatment of international adoption, which until
recently went virtually unregulated. The Hague Convention
was ratified in response to atrocious cases of illegal trafficking in
Romanian children.40  When Romania's dictator Nicolae
Ceausescu fell, families across the world witnessed the suffering
that Romanian children in orphanages endured.4 1 Many fami-
lies flocked to Romania hoping to adopt available and "desirable"
children.42 With no international regulation, a black market de-
veloped in response to the increased demand. 43 "Tales of brib-
ery, forged documents, and bullied mothers" have shocked the
world. 44
example of such socioeconomic exploitation: Alejandra, a Mexican citizen, was
reportedly brought to San Diego illegally to participate in an embryo transfer
for her infertile cousin, Natie Haro, and Natie's husband, Mario. She claimed
that after she was inseminated, she was told the embryo transfer could not be
completed and that she would have to bear the child. She signed a handwritten
agreement stating that she would be paid approximately $1,500, well below the
typical surrogacy fee. Munoz claimed that someone added the statement, "I will
give up my rights to the baby" after she had signed the agreement. Several
months after the birth she contacted the Haros, demanding a higher fee; a cus-
tody battle ensued. Munoz does not speak English, has a second-grade educa-
tion, and is not able to read. The child now lives with the biological father, and
Munoz has only visitation rights. Id.
39. See supra note 29.
40. Kristina Wilken, Controlling Improper Financial Gain in International
Adoptions, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 85, 89 (1995). The Hague Conference
on Private International law initiated the intercountry adoption project, which
developed the convention on protection of children and cooperation in respect of
intercountry adoption. Id.
41. Id. The project of the convention was inspired by new reports of atroci-
ties involving international adoption in Romania after the fall of Ceaucescu. Id.
42. Margaret Liu, International Adoptions: An Overview, 8 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 187, 204 (1994) (asserting that Romanian children are desirable be-
cause they are Caucasian); see also Joan D. Ramos, Ethical Questions About
Adoption of Romanian Children, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 1, 1991, at A7.
43. Liu, supra note 42, at 204.
44. Id. See also Chris Stephen, Alleged Baby Smuggler Defends Adoptions;
Charity Targeted in Several Probes, S.F. EXAMINER, May 15,1995, at A9. In
1993, Hungarian police investigated allegations that a man named John Davies
supervised a group of 28 Romanian mothers who crossed the border, gave birth,
and then returned on their own. Investigators found the babies already
matched to American families, and the U.S. government allowed the children to
stay in order to keep the families intact. See also Bill Frost et al., Lawyers Play
Lead Role in Black Market Trade, TIMES (London) Oct. 15, 1994, available in
1994 WL 9188365 (reporting concerns of Save the Children Romania that some
children were sold "for their organs or for sexual exploitation"). The absence of
[Vol. 6:329336
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The Romanian case and its massive media coverage forced
the UN to address international adoption. The UN recognized
that international trade in adoption is unavoidable, 45 and that
similar abuses would recur if this market went unregulated. 46
Consequently, a task force comprised of thirty-six nations and
sixteen private groups was created to draft a treaty to curb
abuses in international adoptions.47 In 1993, The Hague Con-
vention specifically identified the need to eliminate baby-selling,
child abduction, and trafficking in children. 48
Surprisingly, even though these objectives also apply to
children of international surrogacy, no international treaty
either mentions or defines the scope of surrogacy arrange-
ments.49 Currently, children of surrogacy and their surrogate
mothers lack clear legal status.50 Surrogate children can be sold
any checks on the suitability of parents means that the child's welfare is not
assured in Romania. In addition, desperate parents who are rural and unedu-
cated are willing to sell their children for prices ranging from a pair of gold
earrings to 10,000 pounds. Id.
45. See Wilken, supra note 40, at 87. The Hague Convention of 1993 was
the first time at which the UN directly and unambiguously referred to in-
tercountry adoption. Previous conventions vaguely referred to it by illegalizing
baby-trafficking and recognizing the rights of the child. The 1993 Convention,
however, specifically identified the scope of international adoption. By defining
what would constitute a legal intercountry adoption, the UN accepted that in-
tercountry adoption is a legal activity. Id.
46. See, e.g., Rupert, supra note 37, at All; Merrill, supra note 37, at Al.
47. Liu, supra note 42, at 205.
48. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th
session, Including the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134, 1139 [here-
inafter Hague Convention].
The three goals of the Hague Convention were:
a) to establish safeguards to ensure that intercountry adoptions take
place in the best interests of the child and with respect for his or her
fundamental rights as recognized in international law;
b) to establish a system of co-operation amongst Contracting States to
ensure that those safeguards are respected and thereby prevent the
abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children;
c) to secure the recognition in Contracting States of adoptions made in
accordance with the Convention.
Id. art. 1.
49. Although some of the major treaties on the rights of the child do ad-
dress these concerns, see infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text, based on the
experience with international adoption, the only way to deal with these market
ills is to directly address them.
50. Currently, international law does not define the legal identity of a "par-
ent" in the case of surrogacy; possibilities include the surrogate, the prospective
mother, the husband of the surrogate, and the prospective father.
1997] 337
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internationally and exploited as a commodity.5 1 Surrogate wo-
men can be exploited, abused, manipulated, and intimidated,
and yet have no legal recourse.5 2 Rather than wait until a
"Romanian surrogacy case" surfaces, the UN must directly iden-
tify surrogacy within the Hague Convention.
III. THE ADOPTION MARKET-A CASE STUDY
The surrogacy and adoption markets are so similar that
analysis of one can suggest solutions for the other. The UN real-
ized that the only way to protect the parties involved in adoption
was to first recognize the activity as a legally traded service and
then explicitly define its scope.53 The same analysis may be
used in determining how to regulate international surrogacy.
Until recently, the international community took no explicit
steps to address international adoptions. 54 In the past, it re-
sponded by drafting documents that regulated general abuses
against children. 55 These agreements, however, were not ex-
pansive enough to curb trafficking in adoptive children.56
It is very likely that the UN avoided the abuses occurring in
international adoption because of the controversy surrounding
it. Developing nations are the primary sources of adoptive chil-
51. Even though the general conventions against trafficking in children
could apply, in the case of surrogacy it would be more difficult to identify the
transaction because there is less documentation involved than in the case of
adoption. If the surrogate negotiates the price with the couple and there is no
supervising intermediary or a frame or structure that would give the parties an
idea of the scope and limits of the agreement, the child may be used as a com-
modity by the surrogate to increase her compensation.
52. Krim, supra note 14, at 218-23 (discussing cases of abuse and predict-
ing that the "uncontrolled growth" in this industry will further produce a poten-
tial for exploitation). Patrick McDonnell, Surrogate Motherhood Draws New
Fire; U.S. Case Raises Spectre of Third World Poor Becoming 'Baby Factories'
for the Rich, MONTREAL GAZETrE, Jan. 6, 1989, at C9 (reporting expert's predic-
tions that the next step in the surrogacy process will be to use Third World
rather than Western women as surrogates). Matt Pawa, the head of the Na-
tional Coalition Against Surrogacy has stated that "[it's only a matter of time
before we start crossing more borders and start hiring Third World breeders for
families in this country." Id.
53. Wilken, supra note 40, at 87 (stating that the Hague Convention was
the first U.S. Treaty to explicitly address and provide a procedural framework
for international adoption). Previous to the Hague Convention, the U.S. passed
different treaties generally covering the rights of the child, but from documents
such as the Declaration on Protection of Children it was unclear whether the
UN was a proponent of international adoption. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
338 [Vol. 6:329
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dren.57 Those countries have a surplus in children because they
experience exploding population growth and a concurrent inabil-
ity to provide for these children financially. 58
Furthermore, many citizens of developing countries oppose
international adoption due to their history of colonialism. To
these nations, adoption perpetuates historic exploitation: "first
you want our labor and raw materials; now you want our chil-
dren."59 Adoption is not perceived as a potential source of loving
families for a child, but simply "another means to satisfy the
greed and selfishness of others."60
It is thus not surprising that the UN did not take a stand on
international adoption before the Romanian crisis. 61 Before
1993, the UN only addressed child trafficking and child abuse
through very general conventions. For example, in 1956 the UN
passed the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slav-
ery.62 Although this agreement prohibited trafficking in chil-
dren, it only helped children who were "sexually exploited or
used as laborers."63 In 1986, the UN passed the Declaration on
Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection on Welfare
of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and
57. Liu, supra note 42, at 192. As one commentator states,
This vicious cycle is difficult to escape. With less money and more chil-
dren, families are less able to or completely unable to provide for their
children. As a result, children are frequently abandoned and left to
fend for themselves. If they are not left to the streets, they are placed
in institutions that may not be adequately prepared to care for them.
Id.
58. MARY KATHLEEN BENET, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTIONS 122 (1976) Un-
derdevelopment results from a nation's production of wealth for its exploiters
rather than production of what it needs to maintain itself. Id. at 123. The more
a country gives up its exports and primary products to the United States and
Western Europe, the worse off that nation will be. Id.
59. Id. at 194-95 (quoting Jane Rowe, Perspectives on Adoption, in ADop-
TION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 6 (Euthymia D. Hibbs Ed., 1991)).
60. Liu, supra note 42, at 195.
61. Although the UN passed the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Appli-
cable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoptions in 1965, the treaty
was very general, discussing only applicable jurisdiction. See Hague Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to
Adoptions, Oct. 28, 1964, 4 I.L.M. 338 (1965) [hereinafter Hague Convention
1965]. The Convention does not actively recognize international adoption or
discuss the potential abuses; it discusses only jurisdiction issues. See id.
62. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade, and the Institution and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 266
U.N.T.S. 40.
63. Wilken, supra note 40, at 88.
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Adoption Nationally and Internationally.64 This Declaration,
although referring to adoption, failed to establish a procedural
framework to combat the ills arising from international adop-
tion.65 Soon after, the UN passed the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, "which included the first international declaration
specifically prohibiting child trafficking for any reason."66 The
declaration, however, did not specifically address the placement
of adopted children. 67
In 1988, after massive media coverage of the adoption mar-
ket in Romania, the UN could no longer remain silent. The me-
dia coverage of Romania 68 inspired the Hague Conference on
Private International Law to initiate the Intercountry Adoption
Project, which developed the Convention on Protection of Chil-
dren and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.69
The Seventeenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private In-
ternational Law adopted the final text of the Convention in
1993. Significantly, that was the first time the UN accepted in-
ternational adoption as an existent trade, 70 directly specified the
64. United Nations: General Assembly Resolution Adopting the Declara-
tion on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of
Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption, Sept. 7,
1986, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1096 [hereinafter Declaration on Protection and
Welfare of Children].
65. Wilken, supra note 40, at 88. The declaration did not specifically cover
the issue of adoption for payment or baby selling, for example. Id. In addition,
the Declaration did not explicitly support adoption as a reasonable option. Arti-
cle 17 is the only one that clearly mentions intercountry adoption. Declaration
on Protection and Welfare of Children, supra note 64, art. 17. It states that" if
a child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suita-
ble manner be cared for in the country of origin, intercountry adoption may be
considered as an alternative means of providing the child with a family." Id.
Thus, it appears that intercountry adoption is treated as last resort only. Arti-
cle 18 vaguely states that "[glovernments should establish policy, legislation,
and effective supervision for the protection of children involved in intercountry
adoption." Id. art. 18. It is very vague as to how to treat intercountry adoption
and leaves the procedural responsibility to the individual countries.
66. Wilken, supra note 40, at 88; Convention on the Rights of the Child,
Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1456, (1989). Article 35 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child requires that states take "all appropriate national, bilateral
and multilateral measures to prevent, the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in
children for any purpose or in any form." Convention on the Rights of the Child,
supra, art. 35.
67. Wilken, supra note 40, at 88.
68. See Kennard, supra note 9, at 631.
69. Hague Convention, supra note 48.
70. Id. at 1139 ("The states signatory to the present Convention... [recog-
nize] that intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family
to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of
origin.").
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objectives of the Convention, 71 and required that all signatories
follow the same procedures and requirements.7 2
lV. POTENTIAL REGULATION OF SURROGACY
If surrogacy, like adoption, becomes increasingly interna-
tional, it should be regulated to protect women and children. In-
itially, the Hague Convention provides a framework to develop
appropriate surrogacy regulation. Within this framework, the
UN should accept surrogacy as a legal activity, enforce it in such
a manner as to afford legal protection to the surrogate, and de-
fine it within the scope of an international convention so that
countries can consistently follow it.
A. SURROGACY AS A LEGAL TRADE
Several compelling reasons dictate that surrogacy should be
legalized. First, research shows that as both the incidence and
publicity surrounding surrogacy have grown, more and more
people consider it to be an acceptable means of becoming a par-
ent.73 Second, due to the high demand for surrogacy, prohibit-
ing it will only move it to the black market, leaving the parties
no legal recourse against potential abuses.74
More and more people accept surrogacy as an appropriate
means for childless couples to become parents. In the United
States, surrogacy arrangements have increased from approxi-
mately 500 through the end of 1986 to roughly 4,000 in the mid-
1990's. 75 In the 1980's, potential parents spent more than $33
million dollars in more than 1,200 commercial surrogacy
71. Id. art. 1.
72. Id. art. 1(b). One of the three objectives is "to establish a system of co-
operation amongst Contracting States to ensure that those safeguards are
respected and thereby prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children."
Id. This differs from the previous Convention, in which the states were inde-
pendently responsible for regulating adoption. See generally Hague Conven-
tion 1965, supra note 61. Articles 4 and 6 of the 1993 Convention specifically
discuss the requirements that each signatory state will follow. Hague Conven-
tion, supra note 48, arts. 4, 6.
73. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 10-11, 17-21 and accompanying text.
75. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 5 (1988) (stating that
by the end of 1986 approximately 500 children had been born as a result of
surrogacy contracts); Jay Mathews, California Surrogate Stirs Dispute, WASH.
POST, Sept. 21, 1990, at A8 (stating that experts estimate that as many as 4,000
babies have been born to surrogate mothers in the United States).
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births.76 Even the widely publicized Baby M decision, in which
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that paid surrogacy con-
tracts violated that state's baby-selling laws, did not undermine
public approval of surrogacy contracts. 77 Furthermore, recent
polls indicate that a majority of adults accept surrogacy as a
valid solution to infertility. 78
In addition, surrogacy should be legalized because both of
the parties involved benefit economically. As Judge Richard A.
Posner states:
[t]he case for allowing people to make legally enforceable contracts
of surrogate motherhood is straightforward. Such contracts would not
be made unless the parties to them believed that surrogacy would be
mutually beneficial. Suppose the contract requires the father and his
wife to pay the surrogate mother $10,000. . .. The father and wife
must believe that they will derive a benefit from having the baby that
is greater than $10,000, or else they would not sign the contract. The
surrogate must believe that she will derive a benefit.., that is greater
than the cost to her of being pregnant and giving birth and then sur-
rendering the baby.... [An economist would say.., all of the parties
to the contract are made better off.7 9
Furthermore, recognizing surrogacy as a legal activity
would provide a new source of income for economically disadvan-
taged women.80 Associated with this new source of income are
two positive distributive effects. First, legalizing surrogacy and
allowing women to benefit financially will shift wealth from
childless consumers to less advantaged surrogates.81 It is only
fair that the surrogate be paid for her labor, as sperm donors
and other physical laborers are paid for their work.8 2
Legalization would limit profiteering activities by surrogacy
intermediaries; it would shift the return of profits to the surro-
gate mother rather than to various agents.8 3 Regulation would
allow the surrogate to profit from the arrangement and would
protect her right to be compensated. These marketplace
changes would reinforce the woman's autonomy.8 4 "It is particu-
76. Rebecca Powers & Sheila Gruber Belloli, The Baby Business, DETROIT
NEWS, Sept. 17, 1989, at 1C.
77. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV.
1443, 1489 (1992).
78. Id.
79. Posner, supra note 5, at 22-23.
80. SHALEV, supra note 10, at 158.
81. Id.
82. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the State's Burden of Proof
in Regulating Noncoital Reproduction, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS
AND PRIVACY 24, 32 (Larry Gostin ed., 1988).
83. SHALEV, supra note 10, at 158.
84. Id.
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larly paternalistic to assume that the state can dictate a wo-
man's choice because it knows better than she what is in her
interests as a human being."8 5
However, many consider surrogacy to be far more morally
objectionable than does Judge Posner. In the United States,
several states deem surrogacy contracts void as against public
policy. 86 Many countries prohibit parties from ever entering
such contract.8 7 Even though society generally has grown to
accept it, many interest groups with legislative power oppose it.
Various religious,8 8 academic,8 9 and political90 groups have ral-
lied against surrogacy.
Legally prohibiting surrogacy will only shift the transac-
tions to the black market. The surrogacy market cannot be con-
trolled or eliminated simply by addressing the criminal behavior
of those who create the demand-the childless. 9 1  Further
85. Larry Gostin, A Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements, in
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 3, 10 (Larry Gostin ed., 1988).
86. See Yvonne M. Warlen, The Renting of the Womb: An Analysis of Gesta-
tional Surrogacy Contracts Under Missouri Contract Law, 62 UMKC L. REv.
583, 591-93 (1994). Twelve States (Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and
Washington) and the District of Columbia prohibit surrogacy or make surro-
gacy contracts unenforceable. Several of these States impose criminal sanc-
tions for violations. Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia prohibit
commercial surrogacy but specifically allow surrogacy without compensation.
Id.
87. Id. at 593-94 ("Internationally, laws and policies clearly establish that
surrogacy contracts, especially if commercial, are illegal, unenforceable, con-
trary to public policy and/or void.").
88. See, e.g., Gwen Ackerman, Supreme Court Overturns Ban on Surrogate
Motherhood, Associated Press, July 17, 1995, available in 1995 WL 4397606
(describing religious opposition to legalization of surrogacy in Israel).
89. See, e.g., Institute on Women and Technology, Women and Children
Used in Systems of Surrogacy: Position Statement of the Institute on Women and
Technology, reprinted in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY, 322,
322 (Larry Gostin ed., 1989).
The image of woman as reproductive sexual object, is rooted in most
societies. It is this image of woman as reproductive object at the dispo-
sal of men which must be changed. Surrogacy targets women in vul-
nerable situations: women who are both emotionally and economically
vulnerable. The harm of surrogacy includes the de-humanization, the
objectification and the commodification of women. It contributes sig-
nificantly to lowering the human dignity, worth, and civil status of wo-
men, and undermines women's equal exercise of civil rights by the
constraints of the surrogate contract.
Id.
90. Id. Politically, some feminists argue against surrogacy as promoting
the idea of women as second-class citizens. Many like to compare it to prostitu-
tion even though there are major differences between the two.
91. SHALEv, supra note 10, at 53.
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criminalization would merely entrench the underground nature
of surrogacy.92 "In economic terms, increasing the risk of un-
pleasant consequences merely raises the cost of production
where the demand is more or less set."93 Consequently, the high
demand for babies will override market prohibitions.94 The re-
sults will not be an elimination of the practice, but simply an
increase in prices for services traded on the black market.95
Prohibiting surrogacy would also leave the parties vulnera-
ble to a variety of abuses. When a service is traded illegally, the
parties providing them have no legal recourse. Intermediary ex-
ploitation and dishonesty is effectively granted immunity where
the activity is illegal, since the parties lack access to courts of
law to enforce the terms of the transaction.9 6
The United Kingdom's prohibition of surrogacy was a fail-
ure.97 After the first test-tube baby, Louise Brown, was born in
England in 1978,98 the British government established the War-
nock Committee to study emerging reproductive technologies,
especially their social and legal implications.99 The Committee
recommended criminalizing both profit and non-profit organiza-
tions that recruit women to be surrogates.100 It also sought ex-
press statutory language declaring all surrogacy contracts
unenforceable and void. 101 In support of its recommendation,
the committee stated that the danger of exploitation of women
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The same applies to adoption. When Romania completely prohib-
ited international adoption, the trafficking of children did not stop. Indeed,
many had a vested interest in continuing it. Tales of payments to birth parents
from baby dealers and kickbacks to corrupt judges or lawyers persist, and some
Romanian institutions reportedly "resist efforts to reunite families because it
interferes with the lucrative international adoption." Baby Market Still Flour-
ishes in Romania, supra note 36, at 15A.
95. SHALEV, supra note 10, at 53 (stating that cost of production will
increase).
96. Id. at 158.
97. Arthur Serratelli, Surrogate Motherhood Contracts: Should the British
or Canadian Model Fill the US. Legislative Vacuum?, 26 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. &
ECON. 633, 639-49 (1993).
98. Woman Gives Birth to Baby Conceived Outside the Body, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 1978, at Al.
99. REPORT OF THE COMMirrEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION &
EMBRYOLOGY, 1984, Cmnd. 9314, 1.2.
100. Id. 8.18.
101. Id. 8.19.
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outweighed the potential benefits of surrogacy. 10 2 The recom-
mendation of the Warnock committee became law in 1985.103
Ultimately, the United Kingdom's prohibition of surrogacy
backfired. The Act punishes only third parties for creating com-
mercial surrogacy agreements. Consequently, it encourages the
exploitation of those women who are financially desperate
enough to enter an agreement without third-party representa-
tion. 10 4 It discourages women from seeking legal, medical, and
psychological assistance because, under the Act, they might be
considered third parties. 10 5 The Act encourages surrogates to
enter into "amateurish or exploitative do-it yourself arrange-
ments" without the benefit of medical, legal, or other
counseling.106
Although the intent behind prohibition (i.e., protecting par-
ties from potential abuses) is laudable, it can be satisfied more
effectively by improving the bargaining position of the exploited
person.10 7 The surrogate mother can be provided socioeconomic
power to negotiate the services that she legally provides.108 Ad-
ditionally, legal empowerment would shift income from the in-
102. Id. 8.17.
103. Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, ch. 49 (Eng.). The act specifically
prohibits two activities. First, it prohibits third-party intermediaries from re-
ceiving a fee. It states that the Act applies to such arrangements regardless of
whether they are lawful and whether they are enforceable by or against the
person making them. Id. § 1(9). Thus, it targets the third-party intermediaries
who make, negotiate, or facilitate surrogacy arrangements for a fee. Second,
the Act forbids advertising one's availability to enter into or negotiate a surro-
gacy agreement. Id. § 3. The reason behind this prohibition is that "advertis-
ing may well be a first step towards commercial activities of the kind that the
Bill is designed to prohibit." Serratelli, supra note 97, at 643-44.
104. Serratelli, supra note 97, at 647. Because the Act allows direct and
non-commercial negotiation, it may encourage "amateurish" surrogacy arrange-
ments which can leave both parties vulnerable. The law is so broadly written
as to discourage parties from seeking legal advice to ensure that their rights are
protected. Thus, the surrogate mother could be exploited even further when
entering into an agreement that does not require the contracting couple to pro-
vide her with medical and psychological services.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. SHALEv, supra note 10, at 53. The analysis applies to prohibiting alco-
hol, drug sales, or prostitution. In the case of illegal adoption, the remedy
might be to provide the infertile couple readily available and satisfactory legal
alternatives, such as surrogate mother arrangements and other variations of
reproductive technology. In the case of surrogacy, it might be to allow the sur-
rogate some legal protection to ensure her right to fight unscrupulous in-
termediaries. Id.
108. Id. at 158.
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termediaries to the surrogate, thus improving the financial
position of the surrogate mother.' 0 9
B. SURROGACY SHOULD BE REGULATED TO PROTECT THE
SURROGATE'S RIGHTs
Rather than condemn surrogacy, the UN should recognize
the woman's right to serve as a surrogate. In addition, the UN
must recognize rights that the surrogate should have in per-
forming her services. Those rights include the freedom to termi-
nate the pregnancy and the freedom to keep the child after
giving birth.
The right to be a surrogate can be derived from current UN
documents. Initially, the right to serve as a surrogate should be
derived from the woman's right to privacy in making an inti-
mate personal decision about reproduction." 0 A strong commit-
ment to procreative liberty ensures that womens' interests are
protected."' Consequently, many Western societies place a
high priority on private discretion and choice in reproductive
matters." 2 Extending this argument, if a woman has a recog-
nized right to procreate, that right should also encompass the
woman's right to procreate for the benefit of others." 3
A number of international documents recognize and protect
the woman's right to decide whether to procreate. If they recog-
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. As one commentator has stated:
Although a rights-based approach to reproduction cannot eliminate the
inherent inequalities in male and female procreation, it can provide
substantial protection for women.... Legal recognition of procreative
liberty will protect women from public sector impositions on their pro-
creative choice. Respecting this liberty will stop the state from outlaw-
ing early abortion. Respect for this right will also protect women
against forced sterilization [or] forced abortion.
JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUC-
TrVE TECHNOLOGIES 229 (1994). This feminist critique, analyzing surrogacy as
rights-based, fails because it does not acknowledge that there are two women
involved: one the surrogate and the other the adoptive mother. Women should
have the freedom to control their reproduction. They should have complete
control over their reproductive system.
112. Robertson, supra note 82, at 24-25.
113. A.M. Capron & M.J. Radin, Choosing Family Law Over Contract Law
as a Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLI-
TICS AND PRIVACY 59, 70 (Larry Gostin ed., 1988) (even if the Constitution
should be understood as including a right to bear a child for someone else, it
should not be interpreted as including the right to be paid for it). The right of
the surrogate to be paid for services is derived from the right to be compensated
for services provided. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
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nize the general right to procreate, those documents should be
interpreted to also recognize the right to surrogate. The right to
procreate, or more specifically, the right to decide the number
and spacing of children was first declared a private human right
in 1968 in the Proclamation of Teheran. 114 Other declaratory
instruments also recognized this right, most notably the 1969
Declaration on Social Progress and Development. 115 The rights
became enforceable in 1981, upon ratification of the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women.11 6
In addition to the right of the woman to surrogate, she
should also have the right to be compensated for it. Banning
payment for surrogate services would deprive the surrogate of
compensation for her labor."17 Surrogate services-which en-
compass conception, gestation and birth-are not only arduous
for the surrogate, they satisfy a worthwhile social goal.118 Wo-
men are entitled to compensation for the physical changes in
114. G.A. Res. 2542, art. 4, 22(b), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., 1829th plen. mtg.,
reprinted in 12 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS SERIES 1: RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED
BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 257, 258, 260 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., Oceana Pub-
lications, Inc. 1975). For a discussion of the evolution of this right, see Procla-
mation of Teheran, art. 16, (May 13, 1968), reprinted in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS: A
COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS at 51, 54, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/I/
Rev.5 (1994).
115. United Nations Standards Concerning the Relationship Between
Human Rights and Various Population Questions, reprinted in U.N. DEP'T OF
ECON. & Soc. AFF., THE POPULATION DEBATE: DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
PAPERS OF THE WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE, BUCHAREST 1974, at 349, 350
U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/57/Add.1, U.N. Sales No. E/F/S.75.XIII.5 (1975) (the
right to family planning is an "exclusive right" of parents "to decide freely and
responsibly on the number and spacing of children").
116. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1979). The General Assembly adopted the Women's Con-
vention on January 22, 1980. Inclusion of the right to family planning in the
Women's Convention supports it with the force of an international treaty law.
The provision addressing the right to family planning states:
Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and familial rela-
tions and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women:
The same right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and
spacing of their children and to have access to the information, educa-
tion and means to enable them to exercise these rights.
Id. art.16.1(e).
117. Gostin, supra note 85, at 9-10.
118. Id.
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their bodies, the changes in lifestyle, the work of carrying a fe-
tus, and the pain and medical risk of labor and partition. 119
In addition to compensation, the surrogate should also re-
ceive adequate medical treatment where necessary. Both of
these rights can be interpreted from the Global Tribunal on Vio-
lations of Women's Human Rights.' 20 The Tribunal's panel on
socio-economic rights of women recognized the need to protect
women from socioeconomic exploitation. 12 1 The Tribunal recog-
nized a woman's right to equal remuneration and benefits, in-
cluding equal treatment for work of similar value.122
Furthermore, it recognized that employers should be obligated
to provide medical benefits to all employees. The Tribunal con-
cluded that women should be fairly compensated for their serv-
ices, a finding which can be interpreted to mean that women
should also be compensated for services such as surrogacy. 123
Because medical treatment is a necessary part of surrogacy, it is
a benefit which must also be part of the surrogate's
compensation. 124
While the woman's right to surrogate should be recognized
within her right to privacy, such recognition should not limit her
other rights. In consenting to provide surrogate services, the
woman still has a right to terminate her pregnancy.125 The sur-
rogate should not be able to waive this right. 126
119. See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Ky. 1986) (holding that payments to the
woman under surrogacy contract were for her services rather than for the
baby).
120. See CHARLOrrE BUNCH & NIAMH REILLY, DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY:
THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN AND VIENNA TRIBUNAL FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS 63
(1994).
121. Id. at 66.
122. Id. at 63-73.
123. Id. The problem with this analysis is its implication toward the recog-
nition of prostitution. This argument, however, should not be read to recognize
the right to be compensated for prostitution, a criminal offense in many juris-
dictions. Prostitution is not a normatively accepted activity, while the desire to
have a child is internationally accepted and respected by all societies. Gostin,
supra note 85, at 9-10.
124. See BUNCH & REILLY, supra note 120, at 106 (stating that women
should have the right to enjoy the highest standard of mental and physical
health).
125. See Gostin, supra note 85, at 13 (asserting that there are some rights
that cannot be irrevocably waived; i.e., the person can change her mind even
after she agrees to waive her rights).
126. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing the disparity
in bargaining positions of the surrogate and the prospective parents).
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Within the right to procreate also lies the right to terminate
the pregnancy. Arguably, the same treaties that recognize the
woman's right to make decisions regarding procreation should
encompass the woman's right to have an abortion. 127 The rights
of individuals to decide the number and spacing of their children
makes sense only if it includes the right to abort an unwanted
pregnancy. 128 Currently, however, the issue of whether a wo-
man has an international right to have an abortion is controver-
sial. 129 The language of international ageements indicates an
unwillingness to recognize this right.130
Finally, the surrogate must have the right to change her
mind and keep the child. 131 Surrogacy agreements should not
deny a surrogate the choice to assert her parental claims over
the child. 13 2 When agreeing to the exchange, the surrogate may
have no interest in keeping the child, and she may see the ar-
rangement as simply compensating her for work. 133 Yet, once
the surrogate mother is faced with the actual decision, her
rights become of utmost importance.134 To deny her the freedom
to keep the child punishes her for failing to foresee future emo-
tional developments.
From a practical perspective, the right of the surrogate to
change her mind will also dispel the concern that surrogacy is
merely another form of, baby-selling.13 If the woman has the
right to change her mind and keep the child, any compensation
she receives is not for the baby, which she has the right to keep,
but for the services. As a result, the surrogate should be paid for
her services regardless of whether she relinquishes the child.136
If so, the payment is not for the child that may or may not be
relinquished, but rather for the services that the surrogate
provides.' 37
127. Ivonne Prieto, International Child Health and Women's Reproductive
Rights, 14 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 143, 162 (1993).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 151-52, 171-75.
130. Id. at 151-52.
131. Gostin, supra note 85, at 15-16.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 16.
135. Id. at 12-13.
136. Gostin, supra note 85, at 12-13; see also Krim, supra note 14 at 224-25
(stating that proponents of surrogacy distinguish it from baby-selling because
the surrogate is paid equal amounts throughout the pregnancy term even if the
fetus is stillborn).
137. Gostin, supra note 85, at 3, 8-9.
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C. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF SURROGACY
While the surrogate should have the right to provide repro-
ductive services, the other parties to the transaction should also
be protected.138 To achieve this, the best approach is to explic-
itly regulate it on an international level. 139 This regulation
should explicitly define the scope of the transaction and clearly
state the rights of the parties involved. Unfortunately, surro-
gacy is currently too controversial for countries to agree on its
scope, and it is unlikely that a specific convention explicitly rec-
ognizing surrogacy as a human right will be accepted in the near
future. 140 The more practical approach would be to include sur-
rogacy within an already existing treaty.
One approach would be to include surrogacy within the Con-
vention on Intercountry Adoption. Based on the similarities be-
tween adoption and surrogacy, and the potential abuses that
both encompass, surrogacy could be incorporated within this
adoption treaty. However, adoption differs from surrogacy ar-
rangements in two obvious respects: first, the mother has al-
ready become pregnant by the time any issue of adoption
presents itself; second, the baby usually does not have any bio-
logical connection to either of the adopting parents. 141 However,
some courts have found the two similar enough to apply adop-
tion laws to surrogacy. 142
It remains unsettled whether courts should recognize the
surrogate agreement before the child's birth. The court must al-
ways recognize the rights of the child, even if conceived pursu-
ant to an unenforceable agreement. After the child is born, the
courts have to consider issues that are very similar to adop-
tion-determining which family should have custody over the
138. See FIELD, supra note 75, at 101-02. The surrogate should have equal,
but not more, bargaining power than the potential parents. In an ideal world,
the surrogacy convention could address issues such as extortion by the surro-
gate. Noel Keane, for example, reports on two surrogates, both of whom agreed
to serve without payment of a fee, and later used their position to make de-
mands upon the contracting parties. Keane relays that each surrogate
threatened to abort the fetus or to refuse to relinquish her child at birth if the
parents didn't pay. Id.
139. See Wilken, supra note 40 (discussing the need for uniform regulation
on a national level).
140. Knoppers & LeBris, supra note 13, at 357-58.
141. FIELD, supra note 75, at 84.
142. E.g., Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Arm-
strong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Ky. 1986).
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child and what the child's best interests are. 143 The fact that
the potential parents in the case of surrogacy are genetically re-
lated to the infant does not change the best-interest analysis. 144
In addition, for the potential parents to secure the child, they
will have to adopt the baby because most countries will recog-
nize the woman who gave birth to the baby as the natural
mother.145
The legal dispute in surrogacy arises when the surrogate
changes her mind and wants to keep the baby. Under many
states' adoption laws, there is a time period during which the
biological mother has the right to change her mind.' 46 The same
time period should also apply to surrogacy. 147 If the surrogate
chooses to keep the baby after the time period has expired, the
potential parents may sue to enforce their custody rights to the
child. The potential parents' rights will, however, remain secon-
dary to those of the surrogate because the woman who actually
gave birth to the baby will be considered the natural mother. 48
Even then, the potential parents have some legal recourse in at-
tempting to enforce the adoption. In most cases, the courts will
follow the "child's best interest" approach and place the infant
with the family which will best satisfy its interests. 49
143. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 788-89 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dis-
senting), affg sub nom. Anna J. v. Mark C., 28 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991). Justice Kennard's dissent argues that the "best interest of the child
standard" should be used in surrogacy in a similar way that it is used in tradi-
tional child welfare disputes, such as custody and adoption.
144. FIELD, supra note 75, at 89.
145. See Warlen, supra note 86, at 593-94. Because the United Kingdom
has banned commercial surrogacy, its law defines the birth mother as the legal
mother of any child born of a surrogacy arrangement regardless of whether she
is genetically related to the child. Id. The Council of Europe has also banned
surrogacy arrangements except in exceptional cases and has specifically found
that motherhood is to be determined "by the fact of giving birth rather than
genetics... because of the necessity of giving the child a clear legal situation at
birth." Id. at 594. The laws of Bulgaria and Spain also stipulate that mother-
hood is determined by the fact of giving birth. Id.
146. FIELD, supra note 75, at 89-93.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 92-94.
149. See In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1166-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987). This was the type of analysis that the Baby M court decided to follow.
Even though it did not enforce the surrogacy contract, it allowed the baby to
stay with the adoptive parents rather than with the surrogate, arguing that the
best interests of the child should prevail. The New Jersey Supreme Court af-
firmed in part and reversed in part, invalidating the surrogacy contract as con-
trary to state law, naming the birth mother as the child's mother, but granting
custody to the father because doing so was in the best interests of the child. 537
A.2d 1227, 1234-35 (N.J. 1988).
2Mi-. J GLOBAL TRADE
Natural parents have a fundamental right in the compan-
ionship, care, custody, and management of their children. Their
rights supersede the rights of any third persons, including the
adopting parents.150 Thus, although the potential parents may
be genetically related to the baby, if they are not considered the
natural parents, courts will presume that the best interests of
the child require placement with the birth mother.15 1 Neverthe-
less, when the natural parents are unfit, plan to give the child
for adoption or file for divorce, they threaten the child's welfare.
In that instance, the court must act to protect the child's
rights.152
On an international level, surrogacy should be included in
the Hague Convention. With minor modifications in interpreta-
tion, all three objectives of the Convention could encompass sur-
rogacy. 153 The first objective of the Convention is to "ensure
that intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of
the child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights."15 4
The same objective applies to surrogacy. In determining the
rights of the parties involved in international surrogacy, the
best interests of the child should prevail. The difference be-
tween surrogacy and adoption becomes important only because
the Convention presumes a child's best interest lies with the
natural parents. The Convention states that as a matter of pri-
ority the child should remain with his family of origin.155 How-
ever, in the case of surrogacy the "family of origin" is not readily
150. ARNOLD H. RuTKiN, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 32.01[1] (1981) (there
is a presumption that placement with parents serves the child's best interests).
In most cases the surrogate will be found to be the natural parent, as she is the
one who actually gave birth to the baby. The father may have some recognized
rights, but the Uniform Parentage Act limits the recognition of paternal rights
of the sperm donor. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). Yet one
case involving gestational surrogacy did recognize the potential or donating
parents as the natural parents. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
(holding that the "intent" of the parties to the surrogacy agreement should de-
termine parenting).
151. But see Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). In Calvert, the
court held that the natural parents are the genetically related parents, i.e., the
potential parents. The court stated that "the intended [parents] merit full
credit as conceivers." Id. at 783. Thus, to determine who was the "natural"
mother, whether the embryo donor or the carrier, the court analyzed the "in-
tent" of the parties. Id.
152. Brian J. Carney, Where Do the Children Go?--Surrogate Mother Con-
tracts and the Best Interests of the Child, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1187, 1205
(1988).
153. See Hague Convention, supra note 48.
154. Id. art. 1(a).
155. Id. pmbl.
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apparent-the child may be of a race or culture decidedly differ-
ent than the surrogate mother. In such a case the priority of the
country of origin may be inappropriate; the child may assimilate
more easily with his genetic parents than with the surrogate. 156
The second objective of the Convention is to "establish a sys-
tem of co-operation amongst Contracting States to ensure that
those safeguards are respected and thereby prevent the abduc-
tion, the sale of, or traffic in children."157 These same concerns
apply to surrogacy. In order to eliminate the potential for com-
modifying the child, surrogacy should likewise be regulated.1 58
Like adoption, the exchange of a baby for cash should be deemed
illegal and punished.1 59 A greedy surrogate who uses extortion
and increases the price of her services above the agreed value
should be punished as well. 160 Treating a child as a commodity
is against public policy regardless of whether the child is the
center of an adoption or a surrogacy controversy.161 Thus, the
articles of the Convention that specifically apply to the imple-
mentation of adoption safeguards should apply equally to
surrogacy.
The last objective of the Convention is to ensure that the
contracting states recognize those adoptions that accord with
the Convention.' 62 By requiring all member countries to follow
the same guidelines, the Convention ensures that the safe-
guards are actually implemented. By requiring that the con-
tracting states recognize adoptions, the Convention ensures that
a child who is the subject of international adoption will have a
legal status in both countries. Indeed, the child resulting from
surrogacy should have the same assurance that she has a legal
status in the country in which her new parents reside.
156. Of course this should not be the only factor that the court considers
when determining the best interests of the child. However, even in the United
States the issue of race is a factor in placing children for adoption. See e.g., In
re Petition of R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982); Drummond v. Fulton County
Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 910 (1978).
157. Hague Convention, supra note 48, art. 1(b).
158. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
159. Gostin, supra note 85, at 9.
160. FIELD, supra note 75, at 101.
161. Id.
162. Hague Convention, supra note 48, art. 1(c); see also id. arts. 17-24 (dis-
cussing procedures for rules and procedures for intercountry adoptions).
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VI. CONCLUSION
International trade in surrogacy is becoming far more com-
mon. Surrogacy targets a market in which demand for babies
greatly exceeds supply. Furthermore, surrogacy is a better op-
tion than adoption for many families. Adoption has expanded
significantly internationally, and surrogacy is following the
same trend. Unfortunately, the high demand for babies is likely
to perpetuate the exploitation of surrogates and their children.
However, no international convention currently covers
surrogacy.
While an international treaty specifically covering surro-
gacy would be the best approach to deal with this rapidly emerg-
ing market, the passage of such regulation at this point in time
is unlikely because of its controversial nature. Consequently, an
alternative approach is to incorporate the transaction and the
rights of the surrogates into already existing treaties concerning
international adoption.
